regard to the practicability and advisability of an Invasion of East Tennessee in the autumn of 1S61.[1] Thomas never considered the question from the point of view from which Buell was necessarily obliged always to consider it,—that is, in reference to the (supposed) strength and distribution of the enemy's forces in Kentucky and Tennessee, his intentions and plans, and the probable importance of proposed operations by the Union forces in the western portion of the theatre of war, for the success of which it might very possibly be essential that the Union commander in Kentucky should be free to dispose of his entire force in co-operating with and assisting the army of Halleck.

2. With reference to the movement upon East Tennessee, it may be freely conceded that it was on many grounds very desirable for the Union cause that that region should be occupied by United States troops. But was it wise to undertake the movement until the hold of the Confederates on the States of Kentucky and Tennessee had been loosened and their army had been beaten ? General Buell thought not; and it seems to us that he was clearly right. The first task of the army under Buell Rurely was to defeat the army under Johnston; that done, East Tennessee, or any other part of the

Hurrounding country, could easily be occupied. The comprehensive scheme which Buell counselled aimed at a violent breaking up of the Confederate arrangements for the defence of the two States, and a great, and perhaps a decisive, battle was morally certain ultimately to

[1] See Van Home's *Thomas*, 50, 51.